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MAKING THE RIGHT CALL FOR CONFRONTATION AT
FELONY SENTENCING
Shaakirrah R. Sanders*
Felony sentencing courts have discretion to increase punishment based on un-cross-
examined testimonial statements about several categories of uncharged, dismissed,
or otherwise unproven criminal conduct. Denying defendants an opportunity to
cross-examine these categories of sentencing evidence undermines a core principle of
natural law as adopted in the Sixth Amendment: those accused of felony crimes
have the right to confront adversarial witnesses. This Article contributes to the
scholarship surrounding confrontation rights at felony sentencing by cautioning
against continued adherence to the most historic Supreme Court case on this issue,
Williams v. New York. This Article does so for reasons beyond the unacknowl-
edged dark racial undercurrent that permeated the facts and circumstances of that
case. Instead, this Article challenges the Williams Court’s assumption that judicial
authority existed in pre-Founding felony cases to consider un-cross-examined testi-
mony for purposes of fixing the punishment. This Article also examines whether
recent Court decisions requiring cross-examination of testimonial statements at
trial should cause the Court to reconsider its current understanding of confronta-
tion rights at sentencing. Furthermore, this Article addresses the growing
importance of sentencing hearings given the prevelance of guilty pleas in the mod-
ern U.S. criminal justice system. This work advances the discussion on this issue by
proposing a framework to distinguish between testimonial statements that should be
cross-examined and those that should not. It concludes that, in some circum-
stances, confrontation is the right call at felony sentencing and advocates a
balanced and practical application of this vital right.
INTRODUCTION
[I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that
no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the
liberty to cross examine.1
At his 2005 Senate confirmation hearing for the office of Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, then District of Colum-
bia Circuit Judge John Roberts, Jr. likened judges to umpires,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. I would like to thank
Jelani Jefferson Exum and participants of the 2012 Lutie A. Lytle Black Women Writers
Conference, Emily Chiang and participants of the 2012 Rocky Mountain Junior Scholar’s
Conference, and my colleagues at the University of Idaho College of Law for their extensive
review and critique of this Article. I would also like to thank Kyle Chenoweth for his research
assistance.
1. State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (1794).
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elucidating, “my job [is] to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or
bat.”2 According to the soon-to-be Chief Justice, “[u]mpires don’t
make the rules, they apply them . . . [and] make sure everybody
plays by the rules.”3 The U.S. criminal justice system may demand
more from its judiciary than Roberts described. According to Jus-
tice Brennan, “[J]udges are not mere umpires, but, in their own
sphere, lawmakers—a coordinate branch of government. . . . Moreo-
ver, judges bear responsibility for the vitally important task of
construing and securing constitutional rights.”4
Of course, the Framers of the Constitution did not explicitly de-
lineate the line between “umpire” and “lawmaker,” especially with
regard to “calls” made by sentencing judges in felony cases. The
most significant Supreme Court decision on the issue of judicial
discretion to consider untested evidence at sentencing is Williams v.
New York.5 In this infamous case, the Court held that cross-examina-
tion was not required to test the veracity of information presented
at sentencing hearings.6 According to the Court, trial judges have
always enjoyed broad discretion to “call balls and strikes” when fix-
ing punishment. This Article questions this truth and makes three
arguments in favor of reevaluating Williams. First, Williams incor-
rectly assumed that pre-Founding judicial discretion existed to
consider un-crossed testimony for purposes of fixing felony punish-
ment. Second, the Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington7 casts
doubt on whether Williams continues to control the issue of con-
frontation rights at felony sentencing. Finally, confrontation
principles can be practically and efficiently applied during this
stage of the criminal prosecution.
Perhaps the Williams Court made the right call in 1949 in hold-
ing that cross-examination was not required of statements
presented against felony defendants for the first time at sentencing.
Nevertheless, our trust that the Court made the right call then
should not prevent us from now rethinking constitutional rules for
modern felony sentencing. Williams arose in a world where indeter-
minate sentencing was at its height;8 criminal trials were more
2. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G.
Roberts, Jr.).
3. Id. at 55.
4. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (footnote omitted).
5. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
6. Id. at 249–51.
7. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
8. Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Constitutional Sig-
nificance of the ‘Elements of the Sentence,’ 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 152 (1993).
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common for felony cases than today;9 and unlike today most consti-
tutional rules of criminal procedure did not apply in state courts.10
Additionally, the shared standard between confrontation and due
process that existed at the time11 made it less likely that a contrary
ruling in Williams would have yielded a different result for most fel-
ony defendants.
Today, however, the modern U.S. criminal justice system is “verg-
ing on an assembly line.”12 Due to plea-bargaining, the vast majority
of felony defendants do not have the opportunity to test statements
made against them before the sentencing hearing.13 Justice Ken-
nedy instructs that “[t]o note the prevalence of plea bargaining is
not to criticize it.”14 In this modern system, it can no longer be dis-
puted that the adversarial process does not end once a verdict or
plea of guilty is rendered. As Justice Kennedy instructs, the adver-
sarial process extends to sentencing. Now more than ever, factual
findings made during felony sentencing hearings are as quantita-
tively vital as those that were previously only made during trials.
There is no conclusive empirical evidence that judges, those prima-
rily making the factual findings at sentencing, are more reliable fact
finders than juries.15 Yet, during these proceedings the rules gov-
erning the location of the “strike zone,” i.e. the range of properly
exercised discretion, can vary from court to court.
Crawford gives reason to reconsider the applicability of confronta-
tion principles at felony sentencing—the most critical stage of the
modern criminal prosecution.16 This Article focuses on whether
Crawford’s rejection of hearsay rules as the standard for confronta-
tion reopens doors that many thought Williams had irrevocably
closed. This Article advocates a limited Crawford-based approach to
9. Even if trials were uncommon in 1949, they were not as “rare as the spotted owl” as
they are today. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in
America, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1721, 1721 (2005) (book review).
10. Beale, supra note 8, at 152.
11. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding prior testimony must bear some
“indicia of reliability” though the witness be unavailable).
12. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Originalism as an Anchor for the Sixth Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 53, 62 (2011). Professor Fisher represented defendants in Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004), and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Fisher, supra, at 53 n.*.
13. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.” (inter-
nal citation omitted)).
14. Id.
15. See Eang Ngov, Judicial Nullification of Juries: Use of Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing, 76
TENN. L. REV. 235, 281–83 (2009) (discussing the inherent fallibility of judges in the role of
fact-finder).
16. Admittedly, this may require substantive changes in Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence as it relates to felony sentencing.
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confrontation at felony sentencing.17 Unlike many articles on this
subject, this Article distinguishes categories of statements that
should require cross-examination from statements that should not
require cross-examination. Finally, this Article offers a framework
for making the right call in felony cases.18
Part I of this Article examines Williams and discusses its holding
that a felony defendant was unable to cross-examine information
contained in a probation report that was presented for the first
time at sentencing. It concludes that Williams was a reflection of the
post-Founding shift from a determinate to an indeterminate sen-
tencing model, the latter of which was at its height when Williams
was decided. Part II examines the application of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s Confrontation Clause to felony sentencing before the time
of the Founding. It examines whether pre-Founding courts had dis-
cretion to consider un-cross-examined testimonial statements for
purposes of fixing punishment for felonies. It also explores the
post-Founding emergence of bifurcation and plea-bargaining and
demonstrates that judicial discretion to consider uncrossed infor-
mation at felony sentencing most likely developed during the
emergence of indeterminate sentencing, not from pre-Founding
courts. Part III examines the Court’s recent untethering of due pro-
cess and confrontation principles in Crawford. It argues that
Williams should no longer control whether or when cross-examina-
tion is required at felony sentencing. The Article concludes that
confrontation is the right call where felony sentencing evidence
consists of testimonial statements that are material to punishment
and where cross-examination would assist in assessing the truth and
veracity of such statements.
17. The following issues are beyond the scope of this Article: whether confrontation is
required at felony sentencing as a matter of procedural due process; whether Crawford should
apply at misdemeanor sentencing hearings; and implications of the Jury Trial Clause juris-
prudence that includes Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny.
18. Readers may be surprised to discover that there is an impressive amount of student
scholarship related to the topic of this Article. See, e.g., Note, An Argument for Confrontation
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (1992); Eric P. Berlin, Com-
ment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Failure to Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental
Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 187; Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Of-
ficer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933
(1995); Amanda Harris, Note, Surpassing Sentencing: The Controversial Next Step in Confrontation
Clause Jurisprudence, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1447 (2012); David A. Hoffman, Note, The Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines and Confrontation Rights, 42 DUKE L.J. 382 (1992); Nigel H. Holder, Comment,
Confrontation at Sentencing: The Logical Connection Between Crawford and Blakely, 49 HOW. L.J.
179 (2005); Christine Holst, Note, The Confrontation Clause and Pretrial Hearings: A Due Process
Solution, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1599; Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony,
81 HARV. L. REV. 821 (1968).
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I. WILLIAMS V. NEW YORK
It began with a scream . . . [and] touched off one of the city’s
largest manhunts . . . 19
On April 20, 1947, fifteen-year-old Selma Graff was fatally bludg-
eoned by a bedroom intruder in her family’s East Flatbush
apartment located in Brooklyn, New York.20 In the months after the
murder, a series of burglaries plagued the neighborhood, and East
Flatbush was placed under surveillance.21 At approximately 2:30
a.m. on September 8, 1947, Samuel Tito Williams was taken into
custody for suspicion of burglary.22 Samuel was an eighteen-year-old
African-American youth with a history of trouble with law enforce-
ment, but no prior convictions.23 Samuel’s physical condition was
described as poor. A rheumatic fever weakened his heart and
caused swelling in his legs; the latter made it difficult for him to
walk.24 Selma’s younger brother Donald was also injured in the at-
tack and originally described the killer as a man with reddish skin
who needed a shave.25 The media reported, based on an interview
with one detective, that Samuel fit Donald’s description of Selma’s
murderer.26
19. Robert McG. Thomas, Man Freed in Slaying Wins Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1973,
at 57.
20. Id. The burglar “entered the premises and began to rifle the contents of a dresser,”
which awoke Selma. Brief for Relator-Appellant app. at 6a, United States ex rel. Williams v.
Fay, 323 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1963) (No. 397-27911) (on file with author).
21. United States ex rel. Williams v. Fay, 211 F. Supp. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
22. Williams, 323 F.2d at 66.
23. Id.; see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 7. Detectives indicated that
up to that point there was no evidence that Samuel was anything but a burglar. 8 Receive
Reward in Solving Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1947, at 28.
24. Williams, 323 F.2d at 66.
25. See Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 6. A police teletype released shortly
after the murder described Selma’s killer as “a white man, and the police ‘generally’ were
looking for a white man.” Id. at 6–7. At least one news agency reported that Donald described
the killer as a slender and tall Negro youth. 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder, supra note 23.
But see Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 43.
26. 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder, supra note 23. But see Brief for Relator-Appellant,
supra note 20, at 43. Detectives, who had dubbed Selma’s murderer the “giggling killer,”
argued that Samuel appeared nervous and was inclined to simper or giggle. Thomas, supra
note 19; 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder, supra note 23. Detectives also noted that the killer
dropped a green flashlight when he fled the scene of the Graff home on the night of the
murder. Id. Detectives claimed that Samuel confessed to being the owner of not only the
flashlight, but other items found at the scene of burglaries at other homes. Id.
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Samuel orally confessed to the murder and later submitted a
longhand written confession after eighteen continuous hours of in-
terrogation.27 During the first sixteen hours, detectives were
authorized to only ask about the burglaries.28 At some point, detec-
tives stopped the interrogation and Samuel was taken to the scene
of several suspected burglaries in the hope that a witness could
identify him as the perpetrator.29 It is unclear whether anyone was
able to do so. After the confessions, the District Attorney conducted
a stenographically-recorded question and answer session that began
at approximately 12:45 a.m. on September 9, 1947 and was at-
tended by members of the press.30 Later in the morning, between
6:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., Samuel was booked for murder and taken
to felony court.31 After booking, Samuel was taken to Donald’s
27. Williams, 323 F.2d at 66; United States ex rel. Williams v. Fay, 211 F. Supp. 359, 362
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 14–16. Detectives prom-
ised Samuel that if he confessed, he could see a chaplain and his mother, the latter for whom
he had asked multiple times during the interrogation. Williams, 323 F.2d at 66; see also Brief
for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 16–17. Detectives reported to the media that in his
confession, Samuel indicated that in the hours before the murder he drank “Sneaky Pete,” a
drink concocted of raw whisky and wine, and that he decided to burglarize the Graff home
because he needed money to buy more of the beverage. 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder,
supra note 23.
28. Williams, 323 F.2d at 66; Williams, 211 F. Supp. at 361; see also Brief for Relator-Appel-
lant, supra note 20, at 14.
29. Williams, 211 F. Supp. at 361–62; see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at
14.
30. Williams, 323 F.2d at 66–67; Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 17–18
(describing procedures used and questions asked during the recorded session). The District
Attorney was summoned by the police after Samuel had given both the oral and written
confessions. Id. The recorded questioning ended at 3:00 a.m.—over twenty-four hours after
Samuel’s arrest. Id. It was during this session that Samuel, for the first time, was informed of
his right to remain silent, but he was never advised of his right to counsel. Williams, 323 F.2d
at 67. Soon after, Samuel was taken to the Graff home in order to recreate the murder for
detectives. Williams, 211 F. Supp. at 361; see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at
18–19; Thomas, supra note 19. Upon his arrival, Selma’s mother screamed at Samuel: “Why
did you kill my little girl?” 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder, supra note 23; see also Brief for
Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 20. Police had to physically restrain Selma’s mother from
assaulting Samuel. 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder, supra note 23; Thomas, supra note 19.
As Samuel was escorted from the Graff apartment, a mob, which had assembled on the street,
began calling Samuel a murderer and poking at him with sticks. 8 Receive Reward in Solving
Murder, supra note 23. Approximately twenty Brooklyn police officers were required to escort
Samuel from the premises. Id.
31. 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder, supra note 23; see also Brief for Relator-Appellant,
supra note 20, at 21. Three detectives, two patrolmen, and three other high-ranking police
officers were immediately rewarded for solving Selma’s murder. 8 Receive Reward in Solving
Murder, supra note 23.
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school so that a positive identification could be made, which Don-
ald was unable to do.32 Up to this point, Samuel had not been
provided with the assistance of counsel.33
Despite the confessions, Samuel pled not guilty, and his murder
trial began in January of 1948.34 Donald, the only witness to the
crime, testified during cross-examination that Selma’s killer was a
white man who had red skin and stood five-feet five-inches tall—
seven inches shorter than Samuel, who stood six-feet tall.35 The
next day, Donald recanted his description of the killer, claiming he
was “all mixed up.”36 Curiously, Donald’s recantation came after
speaking the previous evening with detectives and the District Attor-
ney, the latter later submitting that his case in chief did not rely on
Donald’s testimony.37 Regardless, this left the confessions, which
defense counsel argued were the result of coercion, as the only evi-
dence of Samuel’s guilt.38
The all-male jury39 found Samuel guilty of murder in the first
degree, meaning it rejected Samuel’s claims that his confessions
32. Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 21.
33. See Williams, 323 F.2d at 67. Additionally, Samuel was not represented by counsel at
his first arraignment. See Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, app. at 5a. Before the
second arraignment, held on September 11th or 12th, Samuel was visited by private counsel;
it is unclear whether counsel was present at the second arraignment. Compare id. app. at 16a,
with id. at 22.
34. Williams, 323 F.2d at 67; Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 21–22.
35. Williams, 323 F.2d at 67; Witness Helps Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1948, at 20; Slayer
Gets Stay From High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1949, at 17; see also Brief for Relator-Appellant,
supra note 20, at 22–23.
36. Youth Found Guilty of Murdering Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1948, at 46.
37. Williams, 323 F.2d at 67; see also Youth Found Guilty of Murdering Girl, supra note 36;
Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 23. It is unknown whether based on Donald’s
testimony the trial court considered exercising judicial discretion to dismiss the case or de-
clare a mistrial.
38. Williams, 323 F.2d at 67. Samuel “testified, and not without some corroboration, to
brutal torture by the police which had forced him in despair to confess falsely.” Id.; see also
Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 9–11 (summarizing Samuel’s testimony of po-
lice brutality, which included handcuffing Samuel to a hot radiator, squeezing Samuel’s
testicles until he was unconscious, threatening to throw Samuel out a window, and threaten-
ing to shoot Samuel). Samuel testified that detectives spent a good part of eleven hours
beating him with “a blackjack, a rubber hose, and a club.” Thomas, supra note 19; Youth Lays
Confession to 3D Degree, BROOKLYN EAGLE, Jan. 16, 1948, at 1. Samuel also testified that detec-
tives kicked him and punched his left eye. Id. Additionally, defense counsel introduced a
series of photographs taken of Samuel on September 20, 1947. United States ex rel. Williams
v. Fay, 211 F. Supp. 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In rebuttal, the prosecutor offered the testi-
mony of detectives and the district attorney, who denied any coercion. Id. The prosecution
also offered the testimony of the jail clerk who claimed Samuel only complained of swollen
legs caused by rheumatic fever. Id. The jail physician testified that while he did find some
injuries, they were inconsequential compared to the torture described by Samuel. Id.
39. Witness Helps Defense, supra note 35.
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were coerced.40 The same jury recommended a life sentence.41 The
sentencing judge ordered death by electrocution42 based on the evi-
dence presented at trial and additional information obtained from
probation officers and other sources pursuant to the New York
Criminal Code.43 The sentencing judge found that Samuel commit-
ted the uncharged burglaries for which he had originally been
arrested,44 that Samuel “possessed a morbid sexuality,” and that Sa-
muel was a “menace to society.”45 Specifically, Samuel was described
as a “psychopathic liar whose personality [was] permeated with
psychosexual habits of thought and conduct.”46 Convinced that the
40. Williams, 323 F.2d at 67; see also Youth Sentenced to Die in the Chair, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1948, at 48.
41. Williams, 323 F.2d at 65; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045-a (McKinney 1949).
42. Williams, 323 F.2d at 65; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1045, 1045-a (providing, in part,
“[m]urder in the first degree is punishable by death, unless the jury recommends life impris-
onment,” but allowing the presiding judge to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment or
death regardless of the jury’s recommendation).
43. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 242–43 (1949). At the time New York law pro-
vided that:
Before rendering judgment or pronouncing sentence the court shall cause the defen-
dant’s previous criminal record to be submitted to it, including any reports that may
have been made as a result of a mental, phychiatric [sic] or physical examination of
such person, and may seek any information that will aid the court in determining the
proper treatment of such defendant.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 482 (McKinney 1949) (emphasis added).
44. Williams, 337 U.S. at 244. Specifically, the sentencing judge considered approxi-
mately thirty uncharged burglaries to which Samuel had allegedly confessed or had allegedly
been identified as a participant. Id. Samuel was described as a “well schooled” veteran of
burglaries. Brief for Appellant-Defendant at 6, Williams, 337 U.S. 241 (No. 671), 1949 WL
50658 at *6.
45. Williams, 337 U.S. at 244. The sentencing judge stated:
[Samuel] perfected what he thought was a foolproof method of earning a living in an
easy way. Like others of this kind, however, he finally found himself in a situation, not
to his liking, and decided to destroy whatever was in his way to a continued success in
the criminal career chosen by him. It is unfortunate that his path was blocked by this
young girl who showed such bravery, in the protection of her life.
Brief for Appellant-Defendant, supra note 44, at 9. According to the Court, Samuel did not
challenge the accuracy of the report, ask the judge to disregard it, or request an opportunity
to refute any portion through cross-examination or any other means. Williams, 337 U.S. at
244.
46. Youth Sentenced to Die in the Chair, supra note 40. The judge during sentencing dis-
cussed information from a detective that Samuel was seen taking photographs of young
children at public schools. Brief for Appellant-Defendant, supra note 44, at 8. The sentencing
judge also relied on the following as evidence of Samuel’s morbid sexuality:
We also have the situation involving the Goldiner family who resided in the ground-
floor apartment at 145 Legion Street, about two weeks before [Samuel’s] arrest at
about two a.m. At that time, their seven-year-old daughter was asleep alone in a rear
room, the parents being in another room. The child says that she was awakened when
she felt someone twisting her feet. She says that the lower part of her pajamas had
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recommendation of life imprisonment would have been different if
these “facts” had been presented to the jury,47 the judge stated that
“it would stultify [his] conscience” to accept the jury’s sentence.48 A
unanimous New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and
death sentence.49
Samuel appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the nar-
row ground that due process was offended by the denial of an
opportunity to cross-examine or rebut information considered for
the first time at sentencing.50 The Court held that due process was
not “a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in
the mold of trial procedure,” reasoning that such a reading would
“hinder if not preclude all courts—state and federal—from making
progressive efforts to improve the administration of criminal jus-
tice.”51 Due process also could not render a sentence void simply
because a judge obtained out-of-court information to assist in fixing
punishment.52
The Williams Court held due process did not require confronta-
tion at felony sentencing, and so a broad range of unchallenged
evidence could be used to support a higher sentence.53 The Court
been taken off and the defendant placed himself on top of her and placed his penis
between her legs. He had one of his hands over her mouth to prevent her from mak-
ing any outcry. He then arose, and as he was buttoning his pants, she made an
outcry[,] which frightened the defendant, who ran out of the apartment. The mother
of the child says that she found evidence of discharge on the bed of the child. The
child also positively identified the defendant as the one who perpetrated this act.
Id. at 8–9. This evidence was not admitted at trial. Id. at 10.
47. Youth Sentenced to Die in the Chair, supra note 40.
48. Id.
49. People v. Williams, 83 N.E.2d 698, 698 (N.Y. 1949), amended by 84 N.E.2d 446 (N.Y.
1949) (affirming conviction and declining question of whether the conviction “violate[d] the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in that . . . the sentence of
death [was] based upon information supplied by persons with whom the accused had not
been confronted and as to whom he had no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal”).
50. Williams, 337 U.S. at 243. The Court added: “The question relates to the rules of
evidence applicable to the manner in which a judge may obtain information to guide him in
the imposition of sentence upon an already convicted defendant.” Id. at 244.
51. Id. at 251.
52. Id. at 252. Moreover, “[u]nder the practice of individualizing punishments, investi-
gational techniques have been given an important role” and by the mid-twentieth century it
was more necessary to observe the distinctions between trial and sentencing evidentiary pro-
cedure. Id. at 248–49.
53. Williams, 337 U.S. at 252. Justice Murphy offered a short and direct dissent, arguing
that “[d]ue process of law includes . . . the idea that a person accused of crime shall be
accorded a fair hearing through all stages of the proceedings against him.” Id. at 253 (Mur-
phy, J., dissenting) (also urging sentencing judges to hesitate when increasing punishment
beyond that which the jury recommended). Justice Murphy argued:
The record . . . indicates that the judge exercised his discretion to deprive a man of his
life, in reliance on material made available to him in a probation report, consisting
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reasoned that consideration of uncrossed information for purposes
of sentencing was a discretionary power that dated to Pre-Founding
times.54 The Court explained:
[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a na-
tion, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy
under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discre-
tion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in
determining the kind and extent of punishment to be im-
posed within limits fixed by law.55
The Court described New York’s sentencing statute as one that em-
phasized the “prevalent modern philosophy of penology that
punishment should fit the offender, and not merely the crime.”56
New York declared reformation and rehabilitation more important
goals than retribution.57 The Court was apparently content to let
New York (and other states) determine the appropriateness of sen-
tencing procedures “to serve the new goals of indeterminate
sentencing.”58
II. PRE-FOUNDING FELONY SENTENCING AND THE EMERGENCE OF
INDETERMINATE SENTENCING
[T]he sentence is the primary, if not wholly dispositive, stage of the
so-called “correctional” process.59
almost entirely of evidence that would have been inadmissible at the trial. Some, such
as allegations of prior crimes, was irrelevant. Much was incompetent as hearsay. All
was damaging, and none was subject to scrutiny by the defendant.
Id.
54. Id. at 249 (noting the increased involvement of non-judicial agencies, particularly
probation and other investigatory agencies).
55. Id. at 246.
56. Id. at 247–48 (noting that indeterminate sentencing took the place of rigidly fixed
punishments). This is an ideal directly reflective of the indeterminate sentencing model. See
id.
57. Id. at 248. The Court provided no guidance of how Samuel’s death sentence met the
goals of rehabilitation or reformation.
58. Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 318–19 (1992) (dis-
cussing federalism as a theme in Williams).
59. Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1972). Judge
Frankel is considered the father of the mid-twentieth century felony sentencing reform. See
United States v. Clark, 792 F. Supp. 637, 650 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (citing UNITED STATES SENTENC-
ING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY
STATEMENTS 3 n.15 (1987)); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing
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Without a doubt, the Framers would not recognize the modern
American criminal justice system.60 As Justice Kennedy recently ac-
knowledged, plea-bargaining has become so central to the
administration of criminal justice that it is no longer simply an ad-
junct of the system, “it is the . . . system.”61 Perhaps plea-bargaining
occurred at the time of the Founding, though the earliest record
does not appear until 1809.62 Before the Founding, a pre-deter-
mined sentence resulted63 if a defendant was found guilty; a
common prescription for many felonies was death.64 This “determi-
nate” system of unitary trials and sentencing left little or no role for
the trial judge regarding a defendant’s sentence. This was quite dif-
ferent from U.S. practice at the time of Williams, where guilt (or
Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CAL. L. REV. 47, 56 (2011) (discussing the critical impor-
tance of sentencing in light of the modern practice of plea bargaining).
60. See John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 2015 (2005). Douglass noted that in the Framers’ world, criminal
procedure encompassed “a single, unified trial with no separate sentencing.” Id. In contrast,
modern practice “spans two worlds: first a trial, then a sentencing. . . . [W]e treat them as
separate universes, governed by very different rules.” Id. at 1967–68.
61. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE. L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
62. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA 22 (2003). As does Fisher, this work distinguishes between the expressions “clear
plea bargaining” and “guilty plea.” Id. But, this work uses the simple phrase “plea bargaining”
to refer to what Fisher termed “clear plea bargaining.” Fisher uses the phrase clear plea
bargaining to refer to cases where the prosecution makes a concession “in exchange for the
defendant’s plea.” Id. Fisher uses the phrase guilty plea “to refer to cases in which the defen-
dant pled guilty but the record reveals no compensating concession.” Id.
63. Penny J. White, “He Said,” “She Said,” and Issues of Life and Death: The Right to Confron-
tation at Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 387, 396–97 (2007) (describing
modern day trials as involving a bifurcated process by which there is a finding of guilt or
innocence by a jury and a separate determination of punishment by a judge and distinguish-
ing eighteenth century trials, which collapsed both stages into one).
64. Douglass, supra note 60, at 2011 (citing Whitnan J. Hou, Capital Retrials and Resentenc-
ing: Whether to Appeal and Resentencing Fairness, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 19, 30 (2003)); see also Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976) (“At the time the [Bill of Rights] was adopted in
1791, the States uniformly followed the common-law practice of making death the exclusive
and mandatory sentence for certain specified offenses.” (citing HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 5–6, 15, 27–28 (rev. ed. 1967))). Death was by hanging, embowel-
ment, or burning alive. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370. Punishment for other
felonies included mutilation or dismembering, slitting of the nostrils, branding of the hand,
whipping, hard labor, exile, banishment, loss of liberty, and temporary imprisonment. Id.
Despite these myriad of options, Blackstone made clear that the quantity or degree of pun-
ishment was “ascertained for every offence; and that it [was] not left in the breast of any judge,
nor even of a jury, to alter that judgment.” Id. at *371. Blackstone warned that “if judgments
were to be the private opinions of the judge, men would then be slaves to their magistrates,
and would live in society without knowing exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays
them under.” Id.
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innocence) and punishment were determined by bifurcated trial
and sentencing proceedings.65
The text and structure of the Sixth Amendment reflects pre-
Founding determinate sentencing.66 The Sixth Amendment
provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.67
Professor Benjamin McMurray argues that the Sixth Amendment’s
“introductory clause, ‘in all criminal prosecutions,’ prefaces all of
the rights listed in this amendment,”68 which include the rights to
counsel, confrontation, jury trial, speedy and public trial, as well as
rights relating to notice of conduct and access to witnesses.69 How-
ever, the term “criminal prosecutions” is left undefined, and
Founding era documents do not provide guidance on the meaning
or scope of the term.70
Scholars who advocate an “original objective meaning” interpre-
tive approach71 argue that sentencing is clearly within the plain
65. See Douglass, supra note 60, at 1967–70 (“Trial is an adversarial process . . . . An
elaborate body of precedent defines each of the[ ] Sixth Amendment rights, leaving us with
the highly structured, adversarial world . . . . The sentencing world is a different kind of
place: an informal, free-flowing world with few hard rules. . . . [F]ew ‘trial rights’ survive
intact after a guilty verdict . . .”).
66. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 59, at 51 (noting that determinate sentencing
schemes “presented no occasion to consider the extent to which constitutional protections
should be treated differently at sentencing than at trial”).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
68. Benjamin C. McMurray, Challenging Untested Facts at Sentencing: The Applicability of
Crawford at Sentencing After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 589, 615 (2006).
69. Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 492,
507 (2009) (explaining seven procedural protections under the Sixth Amendment).
70. See McMurray, supra note 68, at 616 & n.191; Stephanos Bibas, Two Cheers, Not Three,
for Sixth Amendment Originalism, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 46 (2011).
71. “Original objective meaning” or “original public meaning” refers to “the reasonable
meaning of the text of the Constitution at the time of the framing.” Gregory E. Maggs, A
Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of
the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 462. According to Maggs, some Justices, particu-
larly Antonin Scalia, consider this meaning to be the most significant. Id. As used in this
work, original objective meaning should be distinguished from “original intent” and “origi-
nal understanding.” Original intent refers to the meaning and understanding of the U.S.
Constitution from the perspective of the Framers who participated in the convention that
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meaning of the term “criminal prosecution” as understood at the
time of ratification.72 As Francis Heller, a mid-twentieth century his-
torian, explained: “The ‘criminal prosecution’ begins with the
arraignment of the accused and ends when [the] sentence has been
pronounced . . . or a verdict of ‘[n]ot guilty’ has cleared the defen-
dant of the charge.”73 Using this same approach,74 McMurray
turned to the eminent pre-Founding scholar William Blackstone,75
who described twelve stages of the prosecution, ranging from the
arrest to execution.76 Blackstone did not specifically list or sepa-
rately label sentencing hearings,77 still stage nine, which is labeled
“judgment and its consequences,” corresponds to our modern un-
derstanding of criminal sentencing.78 McMurray noted,
“Blackstone’s description of what happens at ‘judgment’ is precisely
what modern courts do at sentencing.”79
proposed the document to the states for adoption and ratification. Id. at 461. Original under-
standing refers to the meaning and understanding of the U.S. Constitution from the
perspective of those who participated in the various state ratifying conventions. Id.
72. See Douglass, supra note 60, at 2008 (“If the textual question is simply whether a
sentencing is part of a ‘criminal prosecution,’ the answer would seem self-evident. After all,
why bother with the process of criminal prosecution if not for the sentence?”); see also White,
supra note 63, at 393 (arguing that the right to confront at a capital sentencing hearing is
supported by a simple reading of the relevant constitutional text). At least one jurist agreed
with Douglass and White. See United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 407 (8th Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Surely no one would con-
tend that sentencing is not a part, and a vital one, of a ‘criminal prosecution.’”).
73. FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 54 (1951); see also White, supra note 63, at
395 (“Sixth Amendment rights do not begin and end with the in-court proceeding com-
monly known as a trial.”); McMurray, supra note 68, at 616 (arguing that “the entire process
of securing the criminal judgment [is] the prosecution,” and noting that “where a defendant
pleads guilty to one count in exchange for the government’s promise to dismiss other counts,
the government will typically not dismiss the other counts until after the defendant has been
sentenced, [which confirms] that until the defendant has been sentenced, the prosecution is
not yet over”).
74. The standard way of determining original objective meaning of the words and
phrases of the Constitution is to examine founding period writings. Maggs, supra note 71, at
462.
75. See, e.g., McMurray, supra note 68, at 616–18 & nn.191–99 (“William Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England . . . was widely read and relied on by the [F]ounders.”).
76. The twelve stages of the criminal prosecution described by Blackstone are arrest,
commitment and bail, prosecution, process upon indictment, arraignment and its incidents,
plea and issue, trial and conviction, benefit of clergy, judgment and its consequences, rever-
sal of judgment, reprieve and pardon, and execution. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *286;
see also McMurray, supra note 68, at 617. McMurray noted that the term “prosecution,” which
is third in this list of stages, refers only to the charging. See id.
77. See McMurray, supra note 68, at 617–18.
78. See id. at 618 (noting that stage nine “falls chronologically right where sentencing
falls under modern criminal procedure: between trial and appeal”).
79. Id.; see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *368–82.
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Post-ratification meaning and common usage of the term crimi-
nal prosecution support Blackstone and his followers’
understanding that sentencing was considered a part of the crimi-
nal prosecution. An early nineteenth century dictionary defined the
term “prosecution” as the “institution or commencement and con-
tinuance of a criminal suit; the process of exhibiting formal charges
against an offender before a legal tribunal, and pursuing them to
final judgment.”80 Thus, various sources support Blackstone’s
description of the sentencing process as one stage of a criminal
prosecution.81
The text of the Sixth Amendment is not only silent on the mean-
ing of the term “criminal prosecution,” but on whether a
sentencing court has discretionary authority to influence punish-
ment in felony cases. Professors Byrne and F. Andrew Hessick
argued that the drafters of the Sixth Amendment had little reason
to consider trial authority separate from sentencing authority, pri-
marily because at that time “the process of sentencing was virtually
indistinguishable from the process of conviction.”82 Felony crimes
in the pre-Founding determinate era were submitted to a jury, and
the defendant could predict a sentence with precision from the
face of the charging instrument, which flowed from the alignment
of punishment with the crime.83 In this model of unitary prosecu-
tion,84 sentencing evidence in felony cases was by necessity
80. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828); see
also RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1552 (Stuart B. Flexner & Leonore C. Hauck,
eds., 2d ed. 1993) (defining the prosecution as “the institution and carrying on of legal pro-
ceedings against a person”). These definitions clarify that the term includes all aspects of the
criminal proceedings, from charge to acquittal or sentencing (and appeals). For an example
of the Supreme Court turning to the 1828 version of Webster’s dictionary in order to inter-
pret the Confrontation Clause, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
81. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 70, at 46, 48; Chhiblani, supra note 69, at 507; Douglass,
supra note 60, at 2008; Hessick & Hessick, supra note 59, at 51; McMurray, supra note 68, at
618; White, supra note 63, at 395, 397.
82. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 59, at 51 (noting that colonial era judges did not
conduct a formal sentencing proceeding following conviction; instead, most crimes carried a
particular penalty, and the conviction determined the punishment); see also Douglass, supra
note 60, at 1972, 2011 (cautioning against the temptation to conclude that “the Sixth
Amendment contemplates no sentencing rights” simply “because it contemplates no separate
sentencing proceeding”). See generally Bibas, supra note 70, at 46; Herman, supra note 58, at
302–03; White, supra note 63, at 396.
83. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000); see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note
64, at *369 (after verdict “the court must pronounce that judgment, which the law hath
annexed to the crime”); Bibas, supra note 70, at 46, 48 (noting that punishment was immedi-
ately imposed); Douglass, supra note 60, at 1977 (describing English and early U.S. criminal
law as dominated by mandatory penalties, not sentencing discretion). See generally McMurray,
supra note 68, at 592; White, supra note 63, at 397.
84. See Douglass, supra note 60, at 2008 (observing that for the Framers, “a unitary trial
and single jury verdict determined not only guilt or innocence, but life or death as well. With
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presented—and confronted—during the trial.85 According to Pro-
fessor John Douglass, “in both purpose and effect, the trial was the
sentencing.”86 Unfortunately, few Sixth Amendment cases of signifi-
cance were decided during the determinate era,87 and none
concerned whether un-cross-examined evidence could be
presented for purposes of fixing felony punishment or establishing
the limits of judicial discretion at felony sentencing hearings.
Sentencing courts’ discretionary authority in felony cases likely
emerged during the era of indeterminate sentencing. By the early
twentieth century, determinate sentencing was no longer the domi-
nant sentencing model, and by the mid-twentieth century, felony
sentencing reflected indeterminate ideals.88 Indeterminate sentenc-
ing was greatly influenced by the public’s growing aversion to the
death penalty,89 the use of prisons as a sentencing alternative,90 and,
as revealed in Williams, an emerging penological focus on individu-
alized punishment.91 Williams demonstrates how this culminated in
a highly discretionary rehabilitative model that tasked courts with
that system as their point of reference, they crafted a single set of adversarial rights to govern
all of the proceedings . . .”); see also White, supra note 63, at 397.
85. See Douglass, supra note 60, at 2008, 2016. The rules appeared to be different for
misdemeanors. Id. at 2016 (noting that in the late eighteenth century, English and colonial
American judges “exercised a range of discretion in choosing punishment for misdemean-
ants”); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 480 n.7 (noting that, upon misdemeanants, judges
frequently imposed sentences of fines or whippings).
86. Douglass, supra note 60, at 1972–73 (“Bifurcation—separating the guilt determina-
tion from the choice of an appropriate penalty—was a procedure that evolved after the
[F]ounding, initially for noncapital sentencing.”); see also id. at 2020; Hessick & Hessick, supra
note 59, at 51 (describing pre-Founding sentencing as part of the trial); White, supra note 63,
at 397 (noting that pre-Founding felony juries decided both the defendant’s guilt and
punishment).
87. Chhablani, supra note 69, at 492.
88. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247–51 (1949) (explaining due process was not
a “uniform command that courts throughout the Nation abandon their age-old practice of
seeking information from out-of-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more en-
lightened and just sentence”).
89. Douglass, supra note 60, at 2018 (citing STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN
AMERICAN HISTORY 94–100 (2002); Caren Myers, Note, Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sen-
tencing: A Proposal for Use Immunity, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 791–92 (1997)) (noting the
dramatic decline in the number of capital offenses from the 1790s through the mid-nine-
teenth century); see also Sam B. Warner & Henry B. Cabot, Changes in the Administration of
Criminal Justice During the Past Fifty Years, 50 HARV. L. REV. 583, 587 (1937) (noting that the
community saw the need “to reduce the severity of punishments for crime, which in the early
part of the nineteenth century were far in excess of what the public approved” and arguing
that “[b]y 1886, punishments for crime had been brought into line with community
opinion”).
90. Douglass, supra note 60, at 2018 (citing BANNER, supra note 89, at 99, 102). Douglass
argues that the lack of prison cells made imprisonment a relatively rare form of punishment
until the late eighteenth century. Id. at 2016.
91. Id. at 2018 (citing BANNER, supra note 89, at 102–03; Myers, supra note 89, at 792
n.19).
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ensuring that the punishment fit the defendant as well as the
crime.92
Williams demonstrates that at the height of the indeterminate
era, sentencing courts had almost absolute discretion to increase or
decrease punishment within given statutory ranges.93 In the Wil-
liams era, judicial discretion was curbed only by the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and un-
usual punishment.94 Early indeterminate era judges often imposed
sentences based on judge-found facts and rarely sought guidance
from the jury in making such determinations.95 This contrasts
sharply with determinate sentencing, where judges in felony cases
did not appear to engage in post-verdict fact-finding to fix
punishment.96
92. See Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Beyond Blakely and Booker: Pondering Modern Sen-
tencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 654 (2005). Berman describes this as a
“rehabilitative medical model,” and states “[t]he rehabilitative ideal was often conceived and
discussed in medical terms—with offenders described as ‘sick’ and punishments aspiring to
‘cure the patient.’” Id. (citing J.L. MILLER ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM: A REVIEW AND ANNO-
TATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 1–6 (1981)). Berman described sentencing judges and parole officers as
administrative decision makers who “were expected to craft individualized sentences ‘almost
like a doctor or social worker exercising clinical judgment.’” Id. at 655 (citing United States
v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D. Mass. 2004)); see also Douglass, supra note 60, at
2018 n.295 (describing individualized punishment as “reflecting a ‘scientific’ view that crime
was a form of sickness that might be cured with proper treatment”); SANDRA SHANE-DUBOW
ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT,
AND EFFECT 5–6 (1985); Hessick & Hessick, supra note 59, at 52; McMurray, supra note 68, at
592.
93. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 59, at 52. Hessick and Hessick noted that discretionary
schemes were originally premised on the punishment rationale of rehabilitation and that
judges’ assessments were based on specific sentencing characteristics “with an eye towards
reforming the [criminal] defendant’s lawbreaking ways.” Id. Sentencing characteristics in-
cluded the defendant’s age, prior criminal history, employment history, family ties,
educational level, military service, and charitable activities. Id.
94. McMurray, supra note 68, at 592.
95. Id. (citing Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing,
39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 697 (2005)); see also Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic
Process, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 316–19, 354 (2003) (discussing jury sentencing and noting that by
1796, one state sentenced by jury; by 1919, fourteen states sentenced by jury; but by 2003,
only six states continued this practice). But see Douglass, supra note 60, at 2013–14 (describ-
ing the widespread practice of jury sentencing in capital cases during the American
constitutional period).
96. McMurray, supra note 68, at 592 (noting that confrontation at sentencing was irrele-
vant under the determinate model because there was no fact-finding at the time the sentence
was announced and, thus, no witnesses to confront). Blackstone reported that only in excep-
tional cases did determinate era sentencing judges exercise discretion to impose fines and
determine the length of imprisonment. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *371. Generally, the
“nature of the punishment . . . [either] by fine or imprisonment [was] . . . fixed and determi-
nate: though the duration and quantity of each must frequently vary, from the aggravations
or otherwise of the offence, the quality and condition of the parties, and from innumerable
other circumstances.” Id.; see also Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1771, 1814–25 & n.180 (2003).
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Two other notable changes developed during the post-Founding
emergence of indeterminate sentencing: bifurcated trials with guilt
and sentencing phases97 and plea-bargaining.98 Bifurcation evolved
from the “parallel movements” towards judicial discretion and indi-
vidualized punishment.99 Unlike determinate sentencing where the
punishment for most felonies was death, indeterminate sentencing
allowed broader discretion to imprison convicted felons.100 A sen-
tencing judge’s determination of the length of imprisonment
required indeterminate sentencing judges to consider the nature of
the offense and the unique circumstances of the individual.101 Ac-
cordingly, Douglass posited that indeterminate judges needed
more information—which was presented during a separate sentenc-
ing process—than their determinate-era counterparts.102 While the
exact causation is unclear, the advent of offender and offense-ori-
ented sentencing factors established sentencing as a distinct
procedural phase of the trial.103 Once guilt was entered, there were
97. See Douglass, supra note 60, at 2018–19. See generally Iontcheva, supra note 95, at
314–30 (discussing origins of jury sentencing in the United States and causes of its decline);
Michaels, supra note 96, at 1814 n.180.
98. See Mary E. Vogel, The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the
Process of State Formation, 1830-1860, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 161, 161, 174–75 (1999) (noting the
emergence of plea bargaining during the 1830s and 1840s); see also supra note 62 and accom-
panying text (noting 1809 as the earliest example of clear plea bargaining in the U.S.
colonies). The adoption of adult parole and probation services was also an important devel-
opment during the post-Founding era. See Warner & Cabot, supra note 89, at 599 (discussing
creation of reformatories for young male offenders and arguing that adoption of the indeter-
minate sentencing model and parole law occurred together). While the sentencing judge
decided the punishment, it was the parole board that decided the date of release. Id. at 607.
Warner also noted that the first instances of probation occurred in seventeenth century Mas-
sachusetts, and that by 1910 twenty states adopted adult probation statutes. See id. at 598–99.
Warner indicated that the duty of the probation officer was to furnish the judge with infor-
mation about a defendant’s criminal history. Id. at 607. See generally Ricardo J. Bascuas, The
American Inquisition: Sentencing After the Federal Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 11 (2010)
(discussing early statutory history of probation in federal system).
99. Douglass, supra note 60, at 2018. Douglass suggests that bifurcation was the result of
the need to separately consider information at a sentencing hearing that could not be intro-
duced at trial. Id. at 2018–19 (arguing that the rules of evidence conflicted with the emerging
preference for making punishment fit not only the crime, but also the individual criminal
because evidence relating to bad character was considered unfairly prejudicial and inadmissi-
ble at trial).
100. Id. at 2016–17; see also White, supra note 63, at 397–98 (noting that the nineteenth
century saw both the creation of felony sentencing discretion and the division of felony trials
into separate guilt and sentencing phases).
101. McMurray, supra note 68, at 592.
102. Douglass, supra note 60, at 2018 (noting indeterminate era judges’ newfound ability
to exercise discretion and individualize sentences and arguing that “[i]f judges were to tailor
their sentences to fit individual offenders, they needed to know more about that individual
than a trial—or guilty plea—was likely to tell them”).
103. See Herman, supra note 58, at 302.
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few controls to limit the sentencing judge’s discretion to decide a
defendant’s punishment.104
Like bifurcation, guilty pleas also flourished during the indeter-
minate sentencing era. While there is some evidence of guilty pleas
prior to the Founding, such instances were rare in English common
law cases and were infrequent in the U.S. colonies.105 By the late
1830s in Boston, guilty pleas began to appear in significant num-
bers in common-law-based cases; ten years later, they were accepted
for virtually every sort of offense.106 By 1860, guilty pleas were sol-
idly institutionalized,107 and by the late nineteenth century, judges
across the nation had become willing partners in the plea bargain-
ing process.108 Pinpointing when guilty pleas became common is
difficult,109 although by the 1920s the practice was well
established.110
It may be tempting to assume that early plea-bargaining devel-
oped at the initiation of the prosecution, the defense, or both.
However, Justin Miller, an early twentieth century legal commenta-
tor, suggested that prosecutors may not have initiated plea offers
and, in some cases, may not have participated in plea negotiations
at all.111 Instead, Miller opined that trial judges initiated early plea-
bargaining, which could have involved a dismissal, a plea of guilty
to a lesser offense, or a plea of guilty to the charged offense.112
104. Warner & Cabot, supra note 89, at 606–07.
105. See Vogel, supra note 98, at 172; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting
1809 as the earliest example of clear plea bargaining in the U.S. colonies).
106. See Vogel, supra note 98, at 175 (demonstrating a surge in guilty pleas in the Boston
Police Court docket from less than fifteen percent in 1830, to 28.6 percent in 1840, fifty-two
percent in 1850, 55.6 percent in 1860, and eighty-eight percent in 1880).
107. See id. at 174–75 (discussing early practice of plea bargaining in Boston).
108. Mnookin, supra note 9, at 1723, 1728.
109. See Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 106–07 (1928) (noting a
generational increase in the proportion of pleas).
110. Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1927). Miller
argued that the concept of forgiveness by an aggrieved person, which he described as “con-
donation,” was long recognized by 1927 but was “supposed to have no effect in preventing
prosecution. . . . In practice, however, the condonation and compromise of criminal cases
[was] frequent and the methods of evading the clear purpose of the written law [were] va-
ried.” Id.; see also Moley, supra note 109, at 97, 118 (noting that by 1926 in Cook County,
Illinois, 13,117 felony prosecutions entered preliminary hearing and 492 resulted in a com-
plete jury trial; during the same year in Chicago, slightly more than one percent of cases
initiated as felonies resulted in a jury verdict of guilty on the felony charge; these sources do
not specify whether the remaining cases were resolved by dismissals, guilty pleas, or bench
trials). There also appeared to be an increase in jury trial waivers, presumably in favor of
bench trials. See Warner & Cabot, supra note 89, at 592 (noting that in the late nineteenth
century waiver of jury trial in criminal cases was common in few states but that by 1937 it was
permitted in the federal courts and over half of the states).
111. Miller, supra note 110, at 8, 10.
112. Id. at 10.
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Miller also presented evidence that trial judges refused to have any
part in compromises. Other trial judges privately expressed to the
parties the propriety of a settlement. Still other trial judges openly
bargained in court with the accused.113 Cases in which pleas were
commonly used included desertion or failure to provide for wife or
children;114 violation of liquor laws;115 automobile thefts;116 sex
cases, including seduction and statutory rape;117 and larceny or ac-
cusations of issuing fraudulent checks or obtaining money or
property by fraudulent means.118
The rise in guilty pleas coincided with increases in the number of
criminal offenses, which burdened law enforcement officials,119 the
courts,120 and the public.121 Miller argued that inadequate staff,
equipment, and cohesive administrative guidance and direction
made it impossible for law enforcement “to cope successfully with
the professional banditry of [the] scientific age.”122 Professors Sam
Warner and Henry Cabot noted large increases in the number of
petty offenses and the “recent revival . . . of outlawry,” which was
attributed to the inability of the courts and authorities to handle
modern crime.123 J.C. McWhorter, another early twentieth century
legal commentator, lamented that the public had become so accus-
tomed and listlessly indifferent to lawlessness that unpunished
crime had become “a matter-of-course thing in the public mind.”124
Finally, Miller argued that improved means of transportation and
113. Id.; see also Moley, supra note 109, at 103 (describing the early use of guilty pleas as a
defense strategy that also had advantages for prosecutors, who would not be “compelled to
carry through an onerous and protracted trial,” and judges, who “escape[ ] the danger of
being reversed on some point of law”).
114. Miller, supra note 110, at 12.
115. Id. at 13–14.
116. Id. at 14–15.
117. Id. at 15.
118. Id. at 16. Miller attributed the frequency of pleas in fraud cases to the prosecutor’s
difficulty of securing convictions, desire to avoid the expense of a trial, and outright fear of
an acquittal. Id. at 15–16.
119. Id. at 19.
120. See id. at 20 (noting the inadequacy of courts to accommodate increased case loads
and the irksome burden of jury duty on the public); see also Mnookin, supra note 9, at 1728
(arguing that increased caseloads significantly contributed to the judiciary’s changing atti-
tude about the merits of negotiated pleas); Warner & Cabot, supra note 89, at 590 (discussing
the striking growth in the number of cases per judge and noting that the number of judges
did not keep pace with the rapid population growth).
121. Miller, supra note 110, at 12.
122. Id. at 19.
123. Warner & Cabot, supra note 89, at 590, 595.
124. J.C. McWhorter, Abolish the Jury, 29 W. VA. L. Q. & B. 97, 97 (1923).
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communication brought people closer together, multiplied fric-
tions, and increased governmental supervision.125
The increase in the number of criminal acts allowed for an ex-
panded role for counsel.126 The U.S. Constitution reflected an early
acceptance of the adversarial system and a rejection of the English
common law prohibition on defense counsel.127 Experienced de-
fense bars emerged in most U.S. colonies,128 and these lawyers were
knowledgeable about the constitutional rules governing substantive
and procedural criminal rights.129 Originally, this system worked to
the defendant’s advantage. By the mid-eighteenth century, the ac-
quittal rate for represented defendants in New Jersey was seventy-
seven percent, while the acquittal rate for unrepresented defend-
ants was merely eighteen percent.130 From at least 1810 on, almost
every defendant in New York exercised the right to representation
by counsel.131
The mere presence of counsel did not mean that the adversarial
system as we know it today operated during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.132 Still, by the height of the indeterminate
sentencing era the United States had developed a distinct adver-
sarial system. Nevertheless, few constitutionally prescribed controls
limited the sentencing judge’s discretion to decide a defendant’s
punishment. In the next Part, this Article questions whether recent
developments in confrontation jurisprudence require reconsidera-
tion of confrontation rights at felony sentencing.
125. Miller, supra note 110, at 18; see also McWhorter, supra note 124, at 98 (opining that
automobiles afforded criminals the ability to “play hide and seek” with law enforcement).
126. Miller, supra note 110, at 16–18 (noting the creation of new laws prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of liquor, regulating securities, and governing the issuances of checks
and other evidences of value, as well as new laws regulating automobiles); see also Warner &
Cabot, supra note 89, at 585 (noting the increase in crimes committed and prosecuted).
127. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: America Before England,
14 WIDENER L. REV. 323, 327–28 (2009).
128. See id. at 323, 327, 329, 331, 333.
129. See, e.g., id. at 333.
130. Id. at 330–31 (noting that by the middle of the eighteenth century, a defendant in
colonial New Jersey was roughly four times more likely to be acquitted if represented by
counsel).
131. Id. at 332–33.
132. Id. at 334.
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III. A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION
[C]ross-examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth.133
In the decades after Williams, due process became the vehicle
through which the Sixth Amendment and virtually all Bill of Rights
protections were interpreted to apply to criminal defendants in
state courts.134 But the Sixth Amendment was not incorporated in
whole during the six years in which the Court considered whether
the Counsel, Confrontation, and Jury Trial Clauses applied against
the states.135 Interpretations of what due process required varied be-
tween the Amendment’s clauses,136 each of which had to be
separately deemed fundamental or essential to a fair trial.137 Addi-
tionally, some clauses were deemed to only apply at the trial stage
of the criminal prosecution, while others applied beyond the trial.
With regard to sentencing rights, the Confrontation Clause pro-
vided the least protection (actually none).138 The Counsel Clause
provided the broadest protection139 and had already been inter-
preted to apply at all critical stages of federal criminal
prosecutions.140 In fact, for years before Williams, the Court had de-
termined on a case-by-case basis whether the lack of counsel at state
133. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 n.6 (1980) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940))), abrogated by Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 391 (2006).
135. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause makes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel obligatory on
the states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (incorporating the Confrontation
Clause); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (incorporating the Jury Trial
Clause).
136. Chhablani, supra note 69, at 520–21 (discussing the Court’s interpretation of “crimi-
nal prosecution,” the meaning of which depends on the procedural right at issue, and
advocating for a broad definition based on the term “criminal offense”).
137. See, e.g., Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404 (holding that the appearance of confrontation rights
in the Sixth Amendment’s text reflects the Framers’ belief that “confrontation was a funda-
mental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution”); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149
(“[W]e believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of
justice . . . ”).
138. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 211 (1972) (holding that confrontation only ap-
plies to trials). See generally Michaels, supra note 96, at 1779–81 (comparing the Court’s
interpretation of “criminal prosecution” between the clauses of the Sixth Amendment itself
and between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
139. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134–36 (1967) (noting that Gideon did not enumerate
the various stages in a criminal proceeding where the right to counsel applied and making
clear that counsel was required at every critical stage of the criminal prosecution, including
sentencing and probation hearings).
140. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment stands as
a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence . . . ”) (emphasis added).
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and federal sentencing hearings violated due process.141 By the late
1960s, counsel was required for an array of post-verdict proceed-
ings, including sentencing, appeals, and probation hearings.142
In the years following the expansion of the Sixth Amendment,
lower federal courts remained disinclined to reexamine whether
and to what extent sentencing discretion was limited by application
of the Confrontation Clause.143 Relying on the close link with hear-
say rules, many lower federal courts held that confrontation did not
apply post-trial.144 Actual cross-examination was unnecessary to de-
termine reliability, which was all that due process required.145 These
141. See, e.g., id.; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739–41 (1948) (holding that due
process does not allow a defendant to be sentenced on an untrue record, especially where
the assistance of counsel could have prevented the court from proceeding on false assump-
tions); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160–65 (1957) (“The right to counsel is not a right
confined to representation during the trial on the merits.”).
142. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134.
143. McMurray, supra note 68, at 605–07 (discussing lower courts’ failure to “seriously
engage the text of the Sixth Amendment” in ruling that confrontation did not apply at felony
sentencing); see, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir. 1978).
144. See, e.g., Fatico, 579 F.2d at 711–12 (“[M]ost of the information now relied upon by
judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if infor-
mation were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination.”
(quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949))); United States v. Sunrhodes, 831
F.2d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Because restitution hearings are part of the sentencing
process, [only] the Due Process Clause applies . . .”); see also United States v. Beaulieu, 893
F.2d 1177, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing between rights at trial and rights at sen-
tencing and concluding that confrontation rights did not apply at sentencing); United States
v. Marshall, 910 F.2d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that hearsay is admissible for sen-
tencing purposes); United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50–52 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that
cross-examination at sentencing is not required of probation officers regarding the substance
of information included in the PSR); United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1st Cir.
1992) (“[A] defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses . . . does not at-
tach during the sentencing phase.”); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1511 (6th
Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“Many of [the] rights, applicable at trial, are not applicable to the
sentencing process. . . . [C]onfrontation rights are among those in the latter category.”);
United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1993) (agreeing that confrontation
rights do not apply at sentencing), amended by 992 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a criminal sentencing hearing is not
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment). Not all circuits initially adopted this majority
view. See United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100, 103–04 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that while
there is a right to cross examine witnesses at criminal sentencing, the hearsay standard of
reliability governs confrontation challenges), overruled by United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393,
400 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“[P]rotections of the right of confrontation apply at the guilt
phase, but it does not follow that the same protections apply at sentencing simply because
facts proved at sentencing may increase a defendant’s sentence.”).
145. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102–03 (3d Cir. 1990) (arguing that
confrontation violations occur only when a court relies on misinformation of a constitutional
magnitude because hearsay is normally considered at sentencing as long as the due process
standard is met); see also Chhablani, supra note 69, at 498–99 (discussing the Burger Court
and its reading of confrontation rights to require a showing of unreliability as a definitional
element).
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courts reasoned that, for confrontation purposes, the criminal pros-
ecution did not extend beyond Blackstone’s stage seven,146 which
referred to trial and conviction.147 Cross-examination was viewed as
impractical and was predicted to cause endless delay.148 Williams was
given the broadest interpretation,149 and thus, unlike the right to
counsel,150 confrontation was not required beyond the trial.151
Until recently, the Confrontation Clause did not require actual
cross-examination at trial. In fact, it was generally accepted that the
Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules were of the same origin—
due process—and designed to protect similar values—trustworthi-
ness and reliability.152 Ohio v. Roberts best articulated the shared
standard:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examina-
tion at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a
showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is ad-
missible only if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability.”
Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In
146. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
147. See Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d at 1543 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 211 (1972)).
Mancusi involved a New York felony defendant sentenced as a second offender based, in part,
on a prior murder conviction in Tennessee that had been overturned. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at
205. Stubbs challenged the sentence, arguing violations of substantive and procedural due
process. Id. at 209. The Mancusi Court held: “The right to confrontation is basically a trial
right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to
weigh the demeanor of the witness.” Id. at 211; see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725
(1968).
148. Fatico, 579 F.2d at 711–12.
149. Even after Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which recognized limited jury
trial rights at sentencing, federal courts remained unwilling to reconsider whether confronta-
tion also applied at felony sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 527–28
(6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1359–61 (11th Cir. 2006). At least one
state court appeared willing to consider the issue. State v. Hurt, 702 S.E.2d 82, 87–95 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2010) (holding upon de novo review that the Confrontation Clause applies during
non-capital jury sentencing).
150. Chhablani, supra note 69, at 495–96 (discussing expansive extension of right to
counsel to some pre-trial proceedings, interrogations, and identification proceedings).
151. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959) (pre-incorporation case relying on
Williams to hold due process did not require, at sentencing, confrontation of unsworn or out
of court information relevant to the offense or offender characteristics); see also, Beale, supra
note 8, at 152 (“Because Williams was decided before the Confrontation Clause was held
applicable to state proceedings, the Court applied the Due Process Clause.”).
152. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (“[It is a] truism that hearsay rules and
the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values . . . and stem from
the same roots . . . ” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also G. Michael
Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and Melendez-Diaz), 43 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 35, 37 (2009) (noting that until Crawford, confrontation jurisprudence “more or less
tracked the hearsay rule”).
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other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.153
The Roberts Court affirmed the rule that where a witness was un-
available, the Constitution was satisfied by hearsay that was reliable
and trustworthy.154 In Roberts, the defendant was arrested and
charged with forging a check and possessing stolen credit cards.155
Anita Isaacs, the daughter of the victims,156 testified at the prelimi-
nary hearing and admitted that she knew the defendant and that
she permitted the defendant to stay at her apartment for several
days while she was away; she also testified that she neither gave the
defendant her parents’ checks and credit cards nor granted the de-
fendant permission to use them.157 At trial, the defendant testified
that Anita provided the checkbook and credit cards with the under-
standing that he was allowed to use them.158 Anita did not appear at
trial and, after the judge found that she was unavailable, the prose-
cution was allowed to admit her preliminary hearing transcript to
rebut the defendant’s testimony.159 The intermediate courts in
Ohio reversed, finding no good faith showing of unavailability be-
cause the prosecution failed to seek Anita’s whereabouts for
purposes of trial or otherwise determine whether she could be
found.160 Ohio’s highest court reinstated the finding that Anita was
unavailable, reasoning that increased due diligence would not have
procured Anita’s attendance at trial because her whereabouts were
entirely unknown.161 Still, defense counsel’s questioning at the pre-
liminary hearing did not amount to a cross-examination, nor was
the defendant afforded constitutionally sufficient confrontation for
purposes of trial.162 On review, the Court found that the prosecu-
tion made a good faith showing of unavailability and that the
153. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 58.
156. The checks were in the name of Barnard Isaacs, and the stolen credit cards be-
longed to both Isaacs and his wife, Amy. Id.
157. Id. According to the Court, defense counsel neither asked to have Anita declared a
hostile witness nor requested permission to cross-examine her. Id.
158. Id. at 59.
159. Id. at 59–60. Prosecutors sent five subpoenas for four different trial dates to Anita at
her parents’ Ohio residence. Id. at 59. Anita was not present upon execution, nor did she
contact the court. Id. Before admission of the transcript, the trial judge conducted a voir dire
of Anita’s mother, who testified that she infrequently received telephone calls from and knew
of no emergency contact information for her daughter. Id. at 59–60.
160. Id. at 60.
161. Id. at 60–61.
162. Id. at 61.
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defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Anita at
the preliminary hearing.163
Roberts acknowledged that while the Confrontation Clause was in-
tended to limit some hearsay, literal application of the Clause had
been rejected for fear that virtually every hearsay exception would
be abrogated.164 When weighed against competing interests fur-
thered by hearsay rules, Roberts made clear that the Confrontation
Clause only “reflect[ed] a preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial.”165 Additionally, the Court opined that some hearsay rules
stemmed from the same historical origins as the Confrontation
Clause.166 In such cases, reliability was a sufficient surrogate,167 as
due process only required cross-examination when an actual hear-
say violation occurred.168
Perhaps persuaded that hearsay rules strayed too far from con-
frontation’s “original meaning,”169 the Court reexamined the
historical origins and text of the Confrontation Clause twenty-five
years after Roberts in Crawford v. Washington.170 The Crawford Court
ruled that confrontation principles prohibited admission of testi-
monial statements by a wife against her husband, the defendant,
and against whom she could not testify based on spousal privi-
lege.171 The Washington Supreme Court had previously affirmed
admission of Mrs. Crawford’s recorded statements, apparently satis-
fied that they were reliable and trustworthy in accord with Roberts.172
163. Id. at 73, 75.
164. Id. at 63.
165. Id. at 63–64 (emphasis added); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990)
(reasoning that the primary purpose of confrontation is to ensure reliability and that face-to-
face confrontation is only a preference).
166. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
167. Chhablani, supra note 69, at 514 (quoting John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real
Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WAS. L. REV.
191, 206 (1999)).
168. See United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 712–13 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Williams does not
hold that all hearsay information must be considered.”).
169. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). But see Thomas Y. Davies, What Did
the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington,
71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 120–89, 196–206 (2005) (questioning historical accuracy of Crawford’s
reasoning that cross-examination and unavailability would have been required at the time of
the Founding, as well as the use of nontestimonial statements; also arguing that Crawford
glossed over important distinctions between felony and misdemeanor procedure and that at
the Founding, the law had not fully developed hearsay rules or their exceptions).
170. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–50.
171. Id. at 38–40, 68–69.
172. Id. at 41. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed and found that Mrs. Crawford’s
statements contradicted previous statements made in response to specific questions, and that
at one point Mrs. Crawford admitted that she closed her eyes during the incident for which
her husband was on trial. Id.
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The Crawford Court reasoned that history supported two infer-
ences about the Founder’s understanding of confrontation rights.
First, the Confrontation Clause was intended to prohibit ex-parte
examinations as evidence against an accused.173 Second, testimonial
statements of absent witnesses were not allowed without a showing
of unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.174
The Court examined application of hearsay rules in other confron-
tation cases, including Roberts, and held that the due process
standard was (perhaps inherently) unpredictable and unreliable.175
Confrontation standards were higher than due process require-
ments: “Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only
indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is
the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”176 Mrs.
Crawford’s statements closely paralleled those that the Framers in-
tended to regulate,177 and the Court found that admission of her
statements violated confrontation principles.178 Noting that “testi-
monial statements” can be used for purposes other than
establishing the truth of the matter asserted,179 the Court explicitly
limited the scope of the Confrontation Clause to “witnesses against
the accused” who “bear testimony.”180
After Crawford, use of testimonial statements required more than
the due process standard of “minimum indicium of reliability.”181
The Court left for another day how to distinguish between state-
ments that were testimonial and those that were not.182 This
distinction was clarified in Davis v. Washington.183 Davis involved the
admissibility of statements of unavailable witnesses in criminal trials
in both Washington state and Indiana. The Washington courts con-
cluded that statements made in response to questions by a 911
173. Id. at 50.
174. Id. at 53–54.
175. Id. at 60–67 (examining and discussing inconsistences in the application of the relia-
bility standard in post-Roberts confrontation cases).
176. Id. at 68–69; see also id. at 61 (“Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation[, which] reflects a judgment . . . about
how reliability can best be determined.”).
177. See id. at 52–53 (concluding that statements taken by police officers in the course of
interrogations bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in En-
gland); see also Fisher, supra note 12, at 59 (describing Crawford as a “thoroughgoing
originalist opinion”).
178. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–55. The Court found irrelevant both the absence of an oath
and the fact that the interrogators were police officers. Id. at 52–53.
179. Id. at 59 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).
180. Id. at 51–52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
182. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
183. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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operator who answered a victim’s call about a domestic dispute
were nontestimonial and admissible.184 The Indiana courts dis-
agreed about whether to admit a victim’s affidavit that was executed
and given to law enforcement officers who responded to a domestic
disturbance complaint at the victim’s home.185 According to the Da-
vis Court, statements were testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicated that no ongoing emergency existed and the
primary purpose of the interrogation (or questioning) was to estab-
lish or prove past events potentially relevant to a subsequent
criminal prosecution.186 Statements were nontestimonial when given
in the course of an interrogation (or questioning) and where cir-
cumstances objectively indicated that the primary purpose of the
interrogation was to assist police during an ongoing emergency.187
Recognizing that Crawford did not require cross-examination of
every statement, Davis demonstrates the fluidity of the testimonial/
nontestimonial distinction.188 The Court instructed that for con-
frontation purposes, statements might begin as nontestimonial—
i.e., responsive to an interrogation to determine the need for emer-
gency assistance—but later evolve into testimonial statements once
that purpose has been achieved.189 Relying on this reasoning, the
Court ruled that the recorded 911 statements in Washington state
were nontestimonial, and properly admitted, because (1) the victim
spoke about events not in the past, but as they actually happened,
(2) the victim’s call for help was against a bona fide physical threat,
and (3) elicitation of the victim’s statements was necessary to the
184. Id. at 818–19. In the call, the Indiana defendant’s ex-girlfriend provided defendant’s
name and accused him of assault. Id. at 817–18. The defendant was present during this por-
tion of the call. Id. After informing the operator that the defendant had left the scene, the
victim described the context of the assault and provided other identifying information about
the defendant. Id. at 818.
185. Id. at 819–21. In Washington, officers found the victim alone on her front porch; she
later gave permission for officers to enter the home where the defendant, her husband, was
waiting in the kitchen. Id. at 819. After questioning the victim in her living room, officers
provided an affidavit, which she filled out and signed. Id. at 819–20. One officer remained in
the kitchen with the defendant, who attempted to participate in the conversation. Id.
186. Id. at 822.
187. Id.
188. See id. The Davis Court reasoned that “[w]ell into the 20th century . . . Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence was carefully applied only in the testimonial context.” Id. at 824–25.
The testimonial character of the statement separated it from hearsay that was subject to tradi-
tional limitations barring admission under due process, but not confrontation, principles. Id.
at 821. Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations were considered to
be in a core class of testimonial statements. Id. at 822.
189. Id. at 828. The Court expressed confidence in the trial courts’ ability to recognize
the point at which statements became testimonial for confrontation purposes. Id. at 829.
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resolution of an emergency.190 On the other hand, the statements
contained in the victim affidavit in Indiana were testimonial, and
therefore improperly admitted, because (1) there was no emer-
gency in progress, (2) the testifying officer admitted that the
interrogation was part of an investigation into possible past criminal
conduct, and (3) there was a notable lapse of time between execut-
ing the affidavit and the events described therein.191 The Court
later held that testimonial statements also included sworn certifi-
cates by analysts at state crime laboratories,192 as opposed to
statements made by a dying murder victim in response to questions
by law enforcement officers responding at the scene before the vic-
tim’s death.193
Testing the veracity of testimonial statements that are material to
punishment is as compelling at felony sentencing as Crawford and
Davis recognized it is at trial. Originally, the purpose of trial was to
establish the specific offense conduct that constituted a crime, and
the purpose of sentencing was to announce the punishment.194 Lit-
tle judicial discretion existed pre-Founding to influence felony
punishment.195 Fact-finding at the latter stage resulted from bifurca-
tion, which was a post-Founding development.196 Modern plea-
bargaining has shifted fact-finding on offense conduct—and to a
lesser extent offender characteristics—into a structured sentencing
hearing.197 Once guilt is accepted, either as a result of a trial or a
plea, sentencing becomes the focus of all parties, and an accurate
determination of material facts that influence the sentence is of pri-
mary importance for the accused.
This is not to say that confrontation should be required for all
felony sentencing information. When determining whether to re-
quire cross-examination of testimonial statements at felony
sentencing, two key factors are the statement’s materiality to pun-
ishment and whether cross-examination will assist in assessing
veracity or truth. This Article does not suggest exclusive factors or a
190. Id. at 826–29. The Court reasoned that the statements were taken when the victim
was in apparent immediate danger from the defendant and unprotected by the police. Id. at
831. The Court described the statements as not a story about the past, but as seeking aid in
the present. Id.
191. Id. at 829–32. The Court described the affidavit as a narrative of past events deliv-
ered at some point in time after the danger ended, and, according to the testifying officer,
the purpose of the affidavit was to establish events that previously occurred. Id. at 832.
192. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–11, 329 (2009) (“This case in-
volves little more than the application of our holding in Crawford.”).
193. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166–67 (2011).
194. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 86, 95–96 and accompanying text.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 97–110.
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sliding scale whereby the greater the statement’s quantitative value
the more likely cross-examination assists in truth-finding. Both,
however, are important to a determination of whether cross-exami-
nation should be necessary for three general categories of
statements that are regularly considered by sentencing courts. Each
is discussed in turn.
A. Category One: Testimonial Statements to Prove the Existence of a
Prior Conviction
Undoubtedly, prior convictions are material to punishment.
Nonetheless, in most cases cross-examination of this category of tes-
timonial statements is unnecessary. Prior convictions are commonly
proved by certified court records, which are non-testimonial and
widely available electronically. Only in rare cases will testimonial
statements assist in an assessment of the truth of a prior conviction.
B. Category Two: Testimonial Statements to Prove Facts Related to the
Sentencing Offense
Testimonial statements to prove facts related to the sentencing
offense or offenses are material to punishment, especially in our
plea-bargaining system. Defendants who bargain for a plea serve
lower sentences198 because prosecutors do not pursue the most seri-
ous charges or the most severe punishment.199 Determining
whether this category of testimonial statements would assist in an
assessment of truth and veracity is unnecessary where material facts
about the sentencing offense are admitted by the defendant and
entered into the record (or included in the plea agreement) at the
time the plea is accepted. Most police reports, victim and witness
statements, and other documents containing material facts should
have been gathered during the investigatory stage and, upon the
request of defense counsel, disclosed before the plea.200 The trial
198. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 61, at 1909. “Before contracting, the defendant bears the
risk of conviction with the maximum sentence while the prosecutor bears the reciprocal risk
of a costly trial followed by acquittal.” Id. at 1914. Scott and Stuntz argue that “[c]riminal
defendants, as a group, are able to reduce the risk of the imposition of maximum sanctions”
but that prosecutors more than criminal defendants “obtain a larger net return from crimi-
nal convictions” through plea bargaining. Id. at 1915.
199. Id. at 1909.
200. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i) (in federal cases, a document or object is discov-
erable if “the item is material to preparing the defense”). This includes documents or objects
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judge can ascertain the defendant’s knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary acceptance of the statements’ veracity in the same manner as
the court establishes the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver
of other constitutional rights.
Unfortunately, many state courts establish the facts material to
the sentencing offense after accepting the plea.201 At first glance,
this appears part of the promissory exchange—the defendant has
waived his right to trial in exchange for the prosecutor’s recom-
mendation of a specific sentence.202 Still, plea bargains are not
enforced according to “garden-variety” contract principles of offer
and acceptance. Defendants negotiate with the prosecutor but con-
tract with the judge.203 The defendant who agrees to a plea has a
lower reliance on a prosecutor’s promises,204 which rarely include
those related to veracity of testimonial statements regarding the
sentencing offense. Moreover, a prosecutor can only recommend a
sentence to the judge, who alone determines punishment.205 Unlike
a prosecutor’s promises, a defendant’s are rarely revocable after the
plea has been entered. Thus, a defendant’s promise to enter a plea
is a somewhat one-sided agreement.206
Allowing limited cross-examination of testimonial statements to
prove the facts material to the sentencing offense increases the
odds that a defendant will get the agreement for which the parties
have bargained. In the plea bargaining context, the difference be-
tween a good and bad deal depends on defense counsel’s
knowledge of likely trial outcomes, including the behavior of judges
relating to guilt or innocence regardless of whether the material is inculpatory or exculpa-
tory or favorable or unfavorable. See ROBERT M. CARY ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 92
(2011).
201. JAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS 156–59 (1975).
202. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 61, at 1921. “The entire structure of the criminal justice
system presupposes that the relevant entitlements belong . . . to the defendant and prosecu-
tor.” Id. at 1917. Even without a plea deal, defendants are free to enter a guilty plea. Id.
203. Id. at 1954–55. While a prosecutor can promise to recommend a given sentence or
sentencing range, there is no guarantee that a defendant will actually receive that sentence.
Id. at 1954. Scott and Stuntz argue that the prosecutor’s offer is nothing more than an invita-
tion to negotiate, and the deal is sealed only when the parties appear before the court. Id. A
defendant who pleads bears the risk that the court will not follow the prosecutor’s recom-
mendation. Id. at 1956.
204. Id. at 1953. Additionally, the bargain has a presumption of enforceability. Id. at 1917,
1919. While Scott and Stuntz reject arguments that plea-bargaining is socially and morally
harmful, they note that the bargaining process may be burdened by process defects. Id. at
1919.
205. Id. at 1953. The right to take a case to trial is a valuable entitlement, one for which a
prosecutor will pay handsomely. Id. at 1921.
206. Id. at 1954. Most plea bargains are nothing more than “an agreement by both sides
to present the case to the sentencing judge in a particular way—from the defendant’s side,
an agreement to plead guilty to specified offenses; from the government’s side, a promise to
say (or to avoid saying) particular things at sentencing.” Id.
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exercising their sentencing discretion, as well as defense counsel’s
sense of the going “market price” for the crime.207 Even though
defense counsel may be well positioned to have both kinds of infor-
mation, the process suffers from a lack of predictability—
particularly for the defendant. Resolution of the material facts con-
stituting the offense does not occur until after the plea and usually
requires the use of testimonial statements.208 In this manner, the
sentencing hearing itself becomes quite similar to a trial, but results
in sentencing by ambush from the defendant’s perspective. The in-
ability to cross-examine testimonial statements ties counsel’s hands
and leaves the defendant with no meaningful opportunity to test
the material evidence that supports the punishment. Where the
parties agree on the material facts, inclusion of testimonial state-
ments in the plea agreement reduces these risks. Where the parties
do not agree, cross-examination is the right call.
C. Category Three: Testimonial Statements to Prove Relevant Conduct
Like testimonial statements to prove prior convictions and the
sentencing offense, testimonial statements to prove relevant con-
duct are also material to punishment. In both state and federal
courts, “under the concept of relevant conduct, the defendant’s
sentence can be increased by the consideration of uncharged [or]
dismissed . . . conduct.”209 The United States Sentencing Guidelines
(the Federal Guidelines) place no limitations on the use of infor-
mation concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
convicted defendant.210 Sentencing courts can reach far back in
time to determine what conduct relates to the defendant’s con-
victed offense.211 Relevant conduct increases the offense level.212
According to Professor Eang Ngov, relevant conduct could poten-
tially add eighteen to thirty-six points to the base offense level,
207. Id. at 1959.
208. BOND, supra note 201, at 156–57 (noting that before accepting a plea, sentencing
judges rarely make detailed inquiries regarding its factual basis).
209. Ngov, supra note 15, at 236–37.
210. Id. at 267 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006)).
211. Id. at 237–38.
212. Currently, there are three theories of offense level. See id. at 245–47. In a “pure
charge offense system,” punishment is based on the offenses for which a defendant was con-
victed. Id. at 246. In a “real offense system” punishment is based on “all the circumstances
underlying the defendant’s offense, regardless of whether the additional conduct amounted
to convictions or charges.” Id. In a “modified real offense system” the defendant’s relevant
conduct is taken into consideration. Id. at 247. The United States Sentencing Commission,
which promulgated the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, adopted a “modified real offense
system.” Id.
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depending on the offense, the latter of which could turn an initial
sentence of probation into a mandatory life sentence.213 Relevant
conduct determinations dramatically increase sentences, greatly
prejudice criminal defendants,214 and can potentially undermine
the foundation of the U.S. criminal justice system by creating the
risk that society will no longer respect the rule of law.215
Cross-examination of testimonial statements offered to prove dis-
missed and uncharged conduct aids the search for veracity. It is less
likely that testimonial statements regarding dismissed and un-
charged conduct have been tested by a jury or admitted by the
defendant at a trial or any other proceedings. This evidence may
include statements recorded by probation officers during tele-
phone interviews and signed witness statements gathered by law
enforcement or prosecutors.216 Such testimonial statements are
likely to include hearsay, double hearsay, and triple hearsay. During
the plea negotiations, defense counsel may be unaware which state-
ments, if any, will be presented at sentencing, and there is usually
little opportunity to investigate witnesses once the materiality of the
statement becomes apparent. In the federal regime, the Federal
Guidelines were established to implement structure and predict-
ability into the sentencing process.217 However, determining
213. Id. at 284–85 (noting that relevant conduct could add up to eighteen points to the
base offense level for fraud or tax evasion, twenty points for theft, and thirty-six points for
drug offenses and calculating that a thirty-six point increase on a drug offense could turn an
initial sentence of probation into a mandatory life sentence); see also United States v. Wong, 2
F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 1993) (Norris, J., dissenting) (noting that relevant conduct roughly
doubled the defendant’s sentence from eighteen months to thirty months); United States v.
McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (involving a relevant conduct enhancement that
increased the sentencing range from two to three years to twenty to twenty-five years).
214. See Ngov, supra note 15, at 239. Offense sentencing, of both uncharged and uncon-
victed conduct, results in the harshest penalties outside of capital punishment, including life
sentences. Id. at 249. Moreover, “the determination of facts that underlie relevant conduct
can be made without affording the defendant the rights and procedures normally accorded
at trial,” such as the right to confront witnesses and a right to a jury determination of facts. Id.
at 248. The rules of evidence also do not apply. Id.
215. Id. at 296–300.
216. See United States v. O’Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1223 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is a sad but true fact of life under the [Federal]
Guidelines that many of the crucial judgment calls in sentencing are now made, not by the
court, but by probation officers . . .”); see also John S. Dierna, Guideline Sentencing: Probation
Officer Responsibilities and Interagency Issues, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1989, at 3. In the federal
regime, probation officers play a critical role as the court’s independent investigator. Id.
Probation officers prepare all sections of the presentence report provided to the judge, in-
cluding the tentative advisory guideline range based on the information gathered during the
investigation. Id.; see also Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 66 S. CA. L. REV. 357, 364 (1992).
217. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1988); Erin A. Higginbotham, A Meaningless
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whether the right call will be made with regard to the admission of
such evidence is anything but predictable.
Originally, circuit courts were split on the standard to determine
whether dismissed and uncharged conduct could affect punish-
ment.218 The Federal Sentencing Commission sought to clarify the
role of this type of sentencing evidence by amending the Federal
Guidelines to allow courts to consider, without limitation, any infor-
mation concerning the defendant’s background, character, and
conduct.219 Specifically, section 5K2.21 explicitly approved consid-
eration of uncharged and dismissed offenses.220 Circuits are now
split regarding the relationship between such conduct and the sen-
tencing offense.221 Some circuits require a “meaningful
relationship,” while others require no more than a “remote
connection.”222
Despite the serious implications of using uncharged or dismissed
conduct, reliability is the current standard to test the veracity and
truth of such testimonial statements.223 Crawford and Davis make
Relationship: The Fifth Circuit’s Use of Dismissed and Uncharged Conduct Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 267, 270–71 (2008).
218. Higginbotham, supra note 217, at 274–75. Originally, a majority of courts allowed
uncharged offenses to serve as the basis for upward departures if prosecutors could prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct was related to the underlying convictions.
Id. at 280–81. A minority of courts allowed consideration of uncharged offenses if doing so
adequately reflected the seriousness of the actual offense behavior. Id. at 277.
219. Id. at 275.
220. See id. at 275–76. The text of the amendment provides:
The court may depart upward to reflect the actual seriousness of the offense based on
conduct (1) underlying a charge dismissed as part of a plea agreement in the case, or
underlying a potential charge not pursued in the case as part of a plea agreement or
for any other reason; and (2) that did not enter into the determination of the applica-
ble guideline range.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.21 (2013).
221. Higginbotham, supra note 217, at 281–82. Compare United States v. Newsom, 508
F.3d 731, 735 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a remote connection was sufficient for upward
departure based on relevant conduct), and United States v. Rogers, 423 F.3d 823, 828 (8th
Cir. 2005) (same), with United States v. Ellis, 419 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2005) (requiring
a meaningful relationship for upward departure based on relevant conduct), United States v.
Smith, 267 F. 3d 1154, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“the conduct forming the basis for the depar-
ture must be descriptively or logically, and not merely temporally, connected to the crime for
which the defendant was actually convicted”), and United States v. Amirault, 224 F.3d 9, 12
(1st Cir. 2000) (stating that relevant conduct must “relate meaningfully to the offense of
conviction”).
222. Higginbotham, supra note 217, at 282–98. Conduct that is meaningfully related
“sheds further light on the true nature of the offense of conviction.” Id. at 282. Even where
there is a remote connection, the court is allowed to consider unlimited information regard-
ing a defendant’s background. Id. at 283.
223. Acquitted conduct is also included in the category of “relevant conduct” and essen-
tially second-guesses a prior jury’s determination of the truth and veracity of testimonial
statements. A jury has found the testimony insufficient to prove a criminal offense. Despite
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clear that actual confrontation and cross-examination are the best
methods to assess testimonial statements. The fundamental unfair-
ness and prejudice associated with punishing a defendant based on
un-cross-examined testimonial statements is no less compelling at
sentencing than at trial. For this reason, the Court should find that
cross-examination of testimonial statements related to all categories
of relevant conduct is the right call.
CONCLUSION
[T]he very nature of the Sixth Amendment commands fidelity
to its roots.224
In pre-Founding felony cases, judicial discretion did not exist to
call the “balls and strikes” that increased punishment. The text and
structure of the Sixth Amendment is reflective of the pre-ratifica-
tion procedure of unitary prosecution. But criminal sentencing has
taken sharp turns since the Founding. In our modern system, the
vast majority of felonies are resolved by a plea of guilty. As a matter
of practice, few plea agreements provide the factual details neces-
sary to make qualitative decisions about punishment. Today, factual
disputes regarding punishment, including those related offense
the jury’s declaration of “legal innocence,” sentencing courts have received authorization to
consider acquitted conduct to increase the punishment. Id. at 258–60 nn.142–50, 284, 287
(discussing impact of acquitted conduct on subsequent proceedings, including probation
and parole revocation hearings). Until recently, the Court had only addressed this issue in a
per curiam opinion that held the use of such information did not violate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997) (per curium) (“[A]n
acquittal is not a finding of any fact. . . . Without specific jury findings, no one can logically or
realistically draw any factual inferences . . .” (quoting United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386,
1394 (9th Cir. 1996))). Thus, some defendants were “sentenced to same length of imprison-
ment that would have been imposed had he actually been convicted of the offense.” Ngov,
supra note 15, at 242. But see 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *355 (“If the jury therefore find
the prisoner not guilty, he is then for ever [sic] quit and discharged of the accusation . . .”).
Ngov argued that even if acquittals did not prove actual innocence, but that the reasonable
doubt standard was unmet, reconsideration of acquitted conduct was inherently unfair.
Ngov, supra note 15, at 242. The prosecution was given a “second bite at the apple” to prove
conduct already rejected as punishable, which allowed the sentencing judge to ignore the
jury’s previous findings. Ngov, supra note 15, at 261, 267, 288, 291 (arguing that it would be
impossible for innocence to have any significance if the sentencing court is allowed to use
acquitted conduct to increase the sentence; that there should be new evidence to warrant or
justify a court’s reconsideration of acquitted conduct; and that such an outcome is nonsensi-
cal and in contravention of recent Supreme Court Jury Trial Clause precedent, including
Apprendi and its progeny). Currently, the constitutionality of the use of acquitted conduct for
purposes of felony sentencing remains in question. See generally Alleyne v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2151 (2013). (overturning the trial judge’s application of a sentencing factor that the
jury had already rejected as a proven element of the offense).
224. Fisher, supra note 12, at 61.
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characteristics and the defendant’s background and character, are
left to the discretion of the sentencing judge. The issue of whether
the Confrontation Clause applies to uncrossed testimonial state-
ments presented at felony sentencing is thus of utmost importance.
To the extent that such statements are material,225 cross-examina-
tion is the right call where doing so would assist in the assessment
of truth and veracity.
Whether the right calls were made in Williams is no longer in
question.226 Like many judges today, Samuel’s judge was confident
of the “strike zone.” He was also sure that a jury in possession of all
the facts would agree that Samuel’s sentence was just. Still, Samuel
was released from prison after the Second Circuit granted habeas
relief in 1964,227 approximately fifteen years after the post-verdict
finding that he was a “menace to society.” A civil jury ruled against
the City of New York almost ten years after Samuel’s release and
awarded compensatory damages in the amount of forty thousand
dollars for malicious prosecution.228 This verdict no doubt would
have “stultified” the conscious of Samuel’s judge. The Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the award and found it indisputable that the Brooklyn
police acted on no more than a mere suspicion in arresting Samuel
for Selma’s murder.229 Surely, these post-conviction developments
cast doubt on the original calls about the reliability of the sentenc-
ing information used against Samuel. Regrettably for Samuel, it
took twenty-five years to make the right calls.
225. See Klein, supra note 95, at 730–31 (noting increasing sentence lengths post-Booker).
226. See Davies, supra note 169, at 216 (arguing that “[o]riginalism cannot provide valid
justifications for contemporary criminal procedure rulings because the authentic history in-
volves far more discontinuity than is commonly expected”).
227. Fay v. Williams, 376 U.S. 915 (1964).
228. See Williams v. City of New York, 508 F.2d at 356, 358 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Ex-Inmate
of Death House Sues City for $8 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1964, at 16.
229. See Williams, 508 F.2d at 358 (“That the City police acted on no more than mere
suspicion seems indisputable.”).
